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Allocating Credit 
The job of allocating credit among the 
various sectors of  the U.5. economy is 
performed primarily  by  natural market forces. 
But, at various times in our history, we have 
heard calls for selective intervention in the 
credit-allocation process to control total 
credit, or to ensure that adequate credit is 
available to preserve the level of activity in 
"high priority" sectors of  the economy. 
During the Korean War, for example, the 
Federal Reserve imposed minimum-
down  payment and maximum-maturity 
regulations on real-estate and consumer 
credit, as a means of cooling the demand for 
housing and durable goods. In addition, 
regulations of  a different type have developed 
in the mortgage-lending industry, designed to 
increase the flow of credit to the housing 
sector and to protect that sector from the 
sharp downturns which ittends to experience 
during tight-credit periods. For example, the 
limitation on consumer lending by savings-
and-loan associations, and the quarter-point 
differential in deposit-rate ceilings between 
S&L's and banks, reflect a continuing effort to 
allocate credit to housing and thereby 
stimulate more building activity. 
The present tight-credit period may lead to 
further efforts to protect credit flows to special 
sectors of  the economy. Political pressure is 
mounting, for example, to revive the 
Emergency Housing Assistance Act, passed 
during the last recession to assist low- and 
medium-income homebuyers through 
mortgage-rate subsidies. Similarly, the 
National Savi ngs and Loan League has called 
for the extension of  the quarter-point deposit-
rate differential to any institution making a 
substantial commitmentto mortgage lending. 
Whether or  not policymakers should heed 
these calls depends upon the answers to two 
basic questions: First, is there a sound 
economic rationale for allocating credit? And 
second, is it actually possible to allocate 
credit effectively? This article discusses each 
of  these basic issues in turn. 
Why allocate? 
The aim of  credit allocation is to influence the 
sectoral distribution of real resources. But 
why interfere in the normal resource-
allocation processes of  the economy? 
Proponents of credit allocation argue that 
some markets contain externalities or 
imperfections, which make it impossible for 
them to perform their resource-alJocation 
task correctly. For example, the allocation of 
resources to housing would be "too low," it  is 
often argued, without government interven-
tion, because the private market is blind to 
thesocial importance of housing. In this 
view, housing is not only shelter, but also a 
key ingredient in a stable society. 
A similar logic is often used to restrict the flow 
of credit to certain activities. Policymakers 
maintain high margin requirements on loans 
for purchasing corporate stocks, for example, 
because of fears of  destabilizing speculative 
activities, which could have destructive 
consequences for the rest of  the economy. 
Analogously, banks and S&L's presently resist 
making mortgage loans to individuals who 
don't intend to occupy the dwellings they 
purchase, on the grounds that such 
borrowing may lead to speculative excesses. 
Policymakers generally accept this line of 
reasoning about market imperfections, 
although economists have found itdifficultto 
quantify such considerations. 
Some wish to change the allocation of real 
resources in the economy because of 
concerns about the distributional effects of 
monetary policy. When the aggregate supply 
of money and credit in the economy is 
altered, the various sectors of  the economy 
are seldom affected equally. During the early 
stages of a tight-credit period, for example, 
homebuilding activities seem to be hurt 
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allocation thus would like to use controls to 
spread the monetary-pol  icy bu rden more 
evenly over the various sectors of  the 
economy. But would the effectiveness of 
stabilization policy be affected by altering its 
incidence? Some monetary economists 
believe that the "natural" allocational 
impacts of monetary policy are important in 
promoting policy effectiveness, and that 
selective credit controls should not  be used to 
redistribute the burden. Opinions vary on this 
poi nt, however. 
Finally, some economists reluctantly 
embrace selective credit controls as a means 
of offsetting the effects of other controls that 
are already in place in the economy. Thus, for 
example, when Regulation Q deposit-rate 
ceilings interactWith rising market interest 
rates to precipitate disintermediation of  funds 
from primary mortgage lenders, some 
economists would support attempts to 
rechannel resources to the housing industry 
with credit-allocation devices. 
Can credit be allocated? 
Even if  a case can be made for interfering with 
the distribution of real resources, the 
manipulation of  credit flows may not be a 
very effective or economically efficient 
means of  achieving this objective. There are 
both theoretical and practical bases for this 
viewpoint. 
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First, credit conditions affect the cost of only 
one factor of  production -the  cost of  capital. 
(For example, increasing the availability of 
mortgage credit may affect the interest cost.) 
When credit policies alone are used to 
stimulate (or retard) output in a particular 
sector,the mix of  inputs is also affected 
because of a change in relative factor prices. 
Distortion of  the input mix introduces a new 
source of inefficiency, which offsets part of 
any efficiency gains that could be expected 
from the redirection of  output. Mechanisms 
which affect output directly-such  as per unit 
subsidies or taxes on output-would thus be 
preferred to credit-allocation policies on 
theoretical grounds. (Politically, of  course, 
the reverse is true. Tax or subsidy policies 
generate highly visible line items in 
government budgets, whereas the costs of . 
credit-allocation policies are concealed by 
the complexity of  the economy. Hence, most 
pol  icies to promote housing activity involve 
credit-allocation devices even though it 
would be cheaper-in an overall efficiency 
sense-to achieve a given objective with 
direct subsidies.) 
Secondly, credit-allocation policies may be 
criticized because of  the practical difficu  Ity of 
allocating credit in a modern economy in a 
way that actually restricts or enhances a 
particular real sector. The reason is quite 
simple: both borrowers and lenders have 
<;:onsiderable flexibility in substituting one 
type of  credit for another. 
Consider the case of a household that desires 
to acquire additional consumer durables but 
faces (as itdid in 1950-52) alimitation on the 
available amount of consumer credit. If there 
is a one-for-one relationship between 
purchases of consumer durables and 
assumption of  consumer debt, the credit 
restriction will translate into a restriction of 
consumer expenditures. However, the 
typical household has alternative means of 
satisfying its excess demand for durables. (For 
example, it may take on a greater home-
mortgage debt than otherwise, draw down 
financial-asset balances such as savings 
accounts, or sell other real assets to obtain the funds to purchase additional durable goods.) 
An attempt to restrict consumer credit affects 
only one of  the avenues that a household has 
available to facilitate a desired rearrangement 
of its portfolio. Thus, depending upon the 
substitutability (or "fungibility") of consumer 
debt and asset sales in the household 
portfolio, a credit-allocation policy may fail 
to translate into the desired restriction on 
consu mer  -du rable expend  itu res. 
Similarly, restrictions on lending institutions 
can be "evaded" by substitution of  assets 
across financial institutions. Portfolio 
restrictions on S&L's, for example, are 
designed to increase S&L mortgage lending 
and thereby to increase the overall volume of 
mortgage credit. However, by causing S&L's 
in effect to increase their mortgage holdings 
above what they would desire in an 
unregulated environment, the restrictions 
increase S&L's demand for mortgages and 
drive the mortgage yield down relative to the 
yield on alternative types of loans. Thistends 
to reduce the willingness of other institutions 
to offer mortgages while increasing their 
willingness to offer alternative loans, and 
thereby offsets the intention of  the original 
S&L portfolio restriction. 
The longer a credit-allocation device is in 
place, the more likely is the development of 
some means of circumventing it. Thus,· 
restrictions against consumer lending by 
S&L's very likely have promoted the 
development of alternative sources of 
consumer credit, such as credit unions and 
consumer-finance companies. Similarly, 
today's money-market funds would surely 
not exist at their present scale ifdeposit 
interest-rate ceilings had not been used to 
control credit flows at banks and S&L's. 
The evidence 
Several studies have attempted to evaluate 
empirically the extent to which these 
substitution effects thwart the intent of  credit-
allocation policy. Most such studies suggest 
that it is very difficult to manip'ulate the real 
economy with credit controls, except in the 
very short run, because of the ability of 
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borrowers and lenders to innovate and 
effectively circumvent such controls. 
Hamburger and Zwick (Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York), for example, found that 
controls on consumer credit failed to affect 
purchases of consumer durables during the 
Korean War period. Similarly, most studies 
point to the negligible long-run effect of 
attempts to stabilize housing by directing 
credit to this market. Apart from the 
redistribution of economic activity in the 
short run, the only effect of credit-allocation 
restrictions thus may be theinefficiency that 
results from efforts to evade them. 
Altogether, the case for credit allocation is 
clearly not a strong one. Anyone arguing in 
favor of credit allocation must demonstrate 
(a) that there will be economic benefits from 
the intended reallocation of resources, and 
(b) that such a policy will not be thwarted by 
innovative behavior on the part of house-
holds and institutions. At best, credit 
allocation may be effective in a short-term 
countercyclical context to alter the sectoral 
incidence of monetary policy. But this 
application has unknown impl  ications for the 
conduct of macro-economic policy. In this  -
light, it is not surprising that Federal Reserve 
Chairman Volcker emphasized his opposi-
tion to selective-credit controls in recent 
Congressional testimony. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments*  137,670  +  509  +  16,990  +  14.10 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits  adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+ )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed( - ) 
Federal Funds-.Seven Large Banks 
Net interbank transactions 
[Purchases (+  )/Sales (-)] 
Net, U.s. Securities dealer transactions 
[Loans (+  )/Borrowings (-)J 
* Excludes trading account securities. 




















+  69 
+  790  +  16,750  +  17.00 
+  336  +  4,143  +  14.30 
+  125  +  8,664  +  24.30 
9  +  4,170  +  20.30 
+  65  - 240  - 14.90 
- 219  642  8.40 
62  +  882  +  6.00 
+ 1,505  +  5,061  +  12.70 
I 
- 167  +  2,489  +  8.50 
+  148  - 1,564  - 5.20 
- 152  I  +  8,062  +  15.80 
55  !  +  8,862  +  21.40 
212  i  +  2,346  +  12.50 
Weekended  Comparable 
1/30/80  year-ago period 
9  20 
336  31 
- 345  12 
+1,526  +  881 
436  +  346 
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